Moral Disagreement

Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical epistemological political and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it similarly moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications Rach Cosker-Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives? Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers Metaethics and moral disagreement Relativism moral objectivity moral realism and non-cognitivism Moral disagreement and normative ethics Liberalism democracy and disagreement Moral compromise Moral uncertainty. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics metaethics political philosophy and philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as ethics and public policy and philosophy of law. . Language: English